Procedure, Section II - Issue for Jury (Survey of Virginia Case Law - 1955) by Leftwich, James A.
William and Mary Review of Virginia Law
Volume 2 | Issue 3 Article 13
Procedure, Section II - Issue for Jury (Survey of
Virginia Case Law - 1955)
James A. Leftwich
Copyright c 1956 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval
Repository Citation
James A. Leftwich, Procedure, Section II - Issue for Jury (Survey of Virginia Case Law - 1955), 2 Wm. &
Mary Rev. Va. L. 311 (1956), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss3/13
PROCEDURE
Section II.-Issue for Jury, Instructions, Prejudicial and
Invited Error, Qualification of Jurors, Quotient Award.
Issue for Jury. In determining the sufficiency of issues for
submission to jury, recent Virginia decisions have been distin-
guished by the absence, rather than presence, of any departure
from the well-settled principles of rules of Virginia procedure..
In but one case, Fletcher's Admn. v. Horn and Thompson,
197 Va. 317, 89 S.E.2d 89 (1955), did members of the court voice
dissenting opinions. The remaining cases, though occasionally
subjected or subject to discussions of theoretical merit, fall neatly
into the generally accepted procedural patterns.
Fletcber's Admn. v. Horn and Thompson presented an action
for damages which arose from a collision between two motor
vehicles. It was held that the court might properly strike from
the record "indefinite and relative" testimony tending to show
excessive speed by the defendant since there was no proof that
the defendant's alleged speed was the cause of the collision. The
position of the vehicles after the collision was not deemed ad-
missible in evidence to show speed as a cause,1 and, since the de-
fendant's testimony was not otherwise disputed, no issue was pre-
sented for jury determination. The decision is supported by the
principle that it is for the court, not the jury, to determine the
admissibility of evidence,2 although there appears to have been a
too-fine distinction drawn between evidence which is insufficient
for admission and that which is insufficient as conclusive proof.
In contrast is the case of Crist v. Washington, Virginia and
Maryland Coach Co., 197 Va. 642, 85 S.E.2d 213 (1955), where it
was held for the jury to determine whether evidence of the jolt of
a common carrier, which was the alleged cause of plaintiff's in-
jury, indicated a sudden or violent jolt, imposing liability upon the
carrier, or merely a slight and ordinary jolt from which no
liability would result.8
I Buchanan v. Miller, JJ., dissented to this ruling, maintaining that physical
factors were properly jury considerations for the determination of their
appropriate evidential weight
2 Norfolk & W.R.Co. v. Harman, 104 Va. 501, 52 S.E. 368 (1905).
8 Richmond Greyhound Lines v. Ramos, 177 Va. 20, 12 S.E.2d 789 (1941).
In presenting to the jury the question of the defendant's neg-
ligence in Boland v. Love, 222 F.2d 27 (1955), where the de-
fendant, a resident of the District of Columbia, allowed his em-
ployee, known to be untrustworthy and unqualified to drive,
access to an automobile, the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia, obtaining jurisdiction on di-
versity of citizenship,4 held that, since the particular conduct in-
volved in the facts of the case presented a question of the standard
constituting ordinary care which neither Virginia statute nor
final appellate court decision had established, the Federal Court
should apply the law of the Forum, the District of Columbia.
The question of negligence and its causal connection to the
plaintiff's injury were accordingly submitted to the jury.
The issues presented in five additional 1955 cases were refused
submission to a jury on less controversial grounds than those relied
upon in Fletcher's Admn. v. Horn and Thompson.
In Dickerson v. Miller, 196 Va. 659, 85 S.E.2d 275 (1955),
the court held the benefit derived by an employer from the over-
time services of an employee to be sufficient consideration for
transportation furnished to exclude the employee from the pro-
visions of the Virginia guest statute, Code of Virginia (1950),
Section 8-641.1, when injured due to the ordinary negligence of
his employer in operating a motor vehicle. As a matter of law,
such consideration, when bargained for and not merely incidental,
renders the injured person a "paying passenger" under the terms
of the statute and entitled him to a recovery for his injury from
a tort-feasor who has failed to exercise ordinary care.
Hopson v .Goolsby, 196. Va 832, 86 S.E.2d 149 (1955), and
Lambert v. Nehi Bottling Company, 196 Va. 949, 86 S.E.2d 156
(1955), declared pedestrians and motorists, respectively, guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law when, as stated in
the opinion of Hopson v. Goolsby:
... a person having a duty to look 'carelessly undertakes to
cross without looking, or, if looking, fails to see or heed
traffic that is obvious and in dangerous proximity and con-
tinues on into its path, he is guilty of negligence as a matter
of law'.5
4The plaintiff was a resident of Virginia.
5 196 Va. 832, 839, 86 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1955).
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Hanes, 196 Va.
806, 86 S.E.2d 122 (1955), and Southern Railway Company v.
Wilson, 196 Va. 883, 86 S.E.2d 53 (1955), involve the same prin-
ciple upon which Hopson v. Goolsby was decided. Variations
arose in the application of the principle as a result of diverse
statutory provisions.
In Chesapeake and Ohio Railway v. Hanes, the deceased was
held contributorily negligent as a matter of law when she drove
upon a railroad grade crossing in the face of an oncoming train.
An issue for jury determination had been presented in deciding
whether the mandatory signal" had been given by agents of the
defendant-railway company during the approach of its engine.
The failure of the plaintiff to exercise due caution in ascer-
taining the approach of a train was held a bar to his recovery for
injuries in Southern Railway Company v. Wilson, 196 Va. 883,
86 S.E.2d 53 (1955), since signals by the Railway Company were
not mandatory, but merely permissive under the municipal ordi-
nances of the city of Charlottesville. Since the statute does not
provide that contributory negligence shall be considered in miti-
gation of damages except in the case of mandatory signal statutes,
the question of the negligence of the Railway was not considered.
These two cases of comparable factual situations were brought to
different conclusions, procedurally, by the statutory provisions
pertaining to contributory negligence in one and the silence on
the matter of contributory negligence in the other, which gave
application to the Virginia common law rule of contributory
negligence as a bar to recovery.
Instruction-Prejudicial Error.
If a misdirection, or other error, of the court appear in the
record it is presumed to have affected the verdict of the
jury... unless it plainly appears from the whole record that
the error did not and could not have affected the verdict.7
0 Virginia Code 1950, S56-416, providing for the doctrine of comparative
negligence in cases where mandatory warning signals are omitted by
operators of any railroad engine upon its approach to the grade cross-
ing of any public highway.
7 Southern R. Co. v. Forgery, 105 Va. 599, 54 S.E. 477 (1906).
In Spence v. Miller, 197 Va. 477, 90 S.E.2d 131 (1955), the
statement of a trial judge, made upon the defendant's objection
to cross-examination, that the defendant seemed reluctant to give
straight-forward answers, was held to constitute prejudicial error.
Similarly, in order to avoid prejudicial error upon proper
objection by the party aggrieved, the word "shall" as used in an
instruction on the measure of damages for death by wrongful
act8 should be substituted with permissive words such as "may" or
"can" or a phrase such as "are allowed to" 9 to prevent jurors
from attaching undue weight to instructions intended to denote
factors for the jurors to consider in ascertaining damages.
The failure of the court to instruct the jury on the duties
imposed upon motorists by Section 46-244, Code of Virginia
(1955), giving the right of way to pedestrians walking within any
clearly marked crosswalk is prejudicial error. Marshall v. Shaw,
196 Va. 678, 85 S.E.2d 223 (1955).
In Greear v. Noland Company, 197 Va. 233, 89 S.E.2d 49
(1955), it was held that a refusal to sustain objection to imma-
terial evidence, harmful to the plaintiff's action, tended to convey
to the jury that the plaintiff's recovery was dependent upon the
jurors' invalidation of such immaterial evidence. A mere state-
ment by the lower court that a recovery could not be barred by
facts presented in the immaterial evidence was not considered
sufficient to constitute the required, specific direction to disregard
the evidence.
A qualification to the rule of prejudicial error as stated in
Southern R. Co. v. Forgery, appeared in Hodges Manor Corp.
v. Mayflower Corp., 197 Va. 344, 89 S.E.2d 59 (1955) where
error in instructing the jury that they could take into account the
reasonable cost of improvements made necessary by the defend-
ants' acts when measuring damages did not constitute prejudicial
error since the defendants suggested no other theory of damages
and, themselves, offered instructions adopting the same theory.
Invited Error. The rule that an error which was invited, or
introduced, by the party seeking reversal will not constitute a
8 Va. Code 58-633 (1950).
9 Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 578, 90 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1955).
ground for reversal1° formed the basis of the court's decision in
Boward v. Leftwich, 197 Va. 227, 89 S.E.2d 32 (1955), where,
upon the instance of the plaintiff, the jurors were instructed that
the defendant's liability, if any, would be based upon a showing
by the plaintiff of willful and wanton negligence. No objection
was made to the resultant placing of burden and the parties were
thereby bound to the erroneous instruction. A similar case was
Hilton v. Fayen, 196 Va. 860, 86 S.E.2d 40 (1955), where the
defendant acquiesced in plaintiff's erroneous instruction.
In Van Dyke v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1039, 86 S.E.2d
848 (1955), the same rule was held applicable to a criminal pros-
ecution for malicious wounding when counsel for the defendant
failed to preserve his exception to the court's refusal of the de-
fendant's instruction.
Qualification of Jurors-Quotient Awards. Under Sec-
tion 8-199, Code of Virginia (1950), it is provided that the re-
lationship of a "party" to a civil cause to a member of the jury is
ground for the disqualification of that juror. In Petcosky v. Bosw-
man, 197 Va. 240, 89 S.E.2d 4, it was decided that this provision
does not include in the word "party" a counsel who may be re-
lated to one of the jurors, and that the common law rule by
which relationship to counsel does not disqualify a juror should
be applied in such cases. In the instant case the objection to the
juror was made after the juror was sworn and was thus excluded
under the express terms of Section 8-201, Code of Virginia (1950).
Of interest is the ruling of the court in Virginia Electric etc.,
Co. v. Pickett, 197 Va. 269, 89 S.E.2d 76, which extends the rule
governing quotient awards of condemnation commissioners in
eminent domain proceedings. In both, the invalidity must arise
from a previous agreement among the jurors to be bound by
the quotient derived.11 Here, the finding of the commissioners
was based upon a subsequent, not an antecedent, agreement to
ad6pt the figures derived by quotient as fair and just-hence, the
validity of the finding was upheld.
James A. Leftwich
10 Shifett v. Com., 143 Va. 609, 130 SE. 777 (1925); Levy v. Davis, 115 Va.
814, 80 SE. 791 (1914); Norfolk & W.R.Co. v. Mann, 99 Va. 180, 37
SE. 849 (1901).
I Washington Luna Park Co. v. Goodrich, 110 Va. 692, 66 S. 977 (1910).
